

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 21796

NODIS

CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEPR EG IS
SUBJECT: TALK WITH SADAT ON PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER

REF: SECTO 11005

1. SUMMARY: CONVEYED TO SADAT TODAY PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER AND RELATED ORAL POINTS. ALSO OUTLINED PRESIDENT CARTER'S CURRENT THINKING ON POTENTIAL SINAI ZONE DELINEATION DISPUTES. SADAT EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND READILY AGREED SEND GAMASY (ALONG WITH BOUTROS GHALI AND AL BAZ) TO WASHINGTON TO NEGOTIATE WITH DAYAN/WEIZMAN THE SINAI AGREEMENT. TIMING SHOULD BE FIRST CONVENIENT DATE BEGINNING OCTOBER 11, I.E., AFTER EGYPTIAN VICTORY DAY CELEBRATION. RE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES, HE NEEDS A LITTLE TIME TO CONSIDER MATTER. ON SINAI OVERFLIGHTS, HE IS AGREEABLE IN PRINCIPLE, BUT DOES NOT WANT THIS INSCRIBED IN SINAI AGREEMENT. IT IS CONCESSION WHICH SHOULD BE BARGAINED AND FOR WHICH A PRICE SHOULD BE EXACTED FROM ISRAELIS. SADAT WANTS NO REFERENCE IN SINAI AGREEMENT TO "UN INSPECTION", BUT BELIEVES A DE
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FACTO WAY CAN BE FOUND TO ARRANGE THIS. HE SHARES PRESIDENT CARTER'S DESIRE FINISH SINAI TREATY QUICKLY SO THAT IT CAN BE SIGNED ON NOVEMBER 19, FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF HIS TRIP TO JERUSALEM, WITH PRESIDENT CARTER PRESENT. HE HAD NO SUBSTANTIVE IDEAS ON LEBANESE SITUATION, BUT WAS CRITICAL OF CONTINUING SYRIAN MILITARY PRESENCE.
END SUMMARY.

2. I HAVE JUST COME FROM ONE AND ONE HALF HOUR MEETING WITH SADAT. HE LOOKED TIRED AND HAD BEEN UP MUCH OF THE NIGHT LISTENING TO ISRAELI REPORTS ON THE KNESSET DEBATE. AND, AS HE USUALLY DOES, HE WAS FASTING TODAY. HE WAS NEVERTHELESS IN GOOD SPIRITS.

3. I FIRST CONVEYED PRESIDENT CARTER'S AND YOUR GOOD WISHES AND GAVE HIM A SIGNED COPY OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER. I THEN READ HIM THE LETTER, WHICH HE WAS CLEARLY PLEASED TO RECEIVE. HE ASKED SEVERAL TIMES ABOUT "MY DEAR FRIEND, PRESIDENT CARTER" AND SPOKE OF HIS DEEP APPRECIATION FOR THE PRESIDENT'S INTEREST, EFFORT AND SUPPORT. PRESIDENT CARTER COULD BE ASSURED THAT HE WILL NOT LET HIM DOWN.

4. I THEN RAISED WITH SADAT THE THREE ISSUES WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED THAT I TAKE UP WITH HIM, NAMELY (A) GAMASY'S COMING TO WASHINGTON TO NEGOTIATE WITH DAYAN/WEIZMAN THE SINAI AGREEMENT, (B) THE NEED FOR SADAT TO DESIGNATE SOME PALESTINIANS AS ADVISERS TO THE EGYPTIAN DELEGATION AND FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS ESTABLISHING A WEST BANK/GAZA SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY, AND (C) THE MATTER OF ISRAELI OVERFLIGHTS OF SINAI. SADAT'S COMMENTS FOLLOW:

-- A. ALTHOUGH SADAT EXPRESSED SOME SURPRISE THAT THE
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PRESIDENT NOW BELIEVES THAT THE SINAI NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BEST TAKE PLACE IN WASHINGTON, HE READILY AGREED TO THE SUGGESTION. HE EXPRESSED HIS WILLINGNESS TO SEND GAMASY TO WASHINGTON FOR THIS PURPOSE. HE INDICATED ACTING FONMIN BOUTROS GHALI AND MFA UNDERSEC USAMA AL BAZ WILL ACCOMPANY GAMASY. SADAT AGREED THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD GET UNDER WAY WITHOUT DELAY. ON SPECIFIC DATES, HE NOTED THE UPCOMING ISRAELI RELIGIOUS HOLIDAYS AND THE EGYPTIAN OCTOBER 6 VICTORY DAY CELEBRATIONS. FESTIVITIES FOR THE LATTER, HE SAID, WILL LAST THROUGH OCTOBER 10 AND WILL REQUIRE GAMASY'S PRESENCE. HENCE, GAMASY AND THE EGYPTIAN TEAM WILL BE AVAILABLE ANY TIME THAT IS CONVENIENT FOR US AND THE ISRAELIS, BEGINNING ON OCTOBER 11. SINCE THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER HAD REFERRED TO WEIZMAN AS THE ISRAELI NEGOTIATOR, I THOUGHT IT BEST TO MENTION TO HIM BEGIN'S VIEWS ON THE NEGOTIATIONS AS SET FORTH PARA 2, TEL AVIV'S 13292. SADAT WAS SOMEWHAT DISAPPOINTED THAT DAYAN RATHER THAN WEIZMAN WILL HEAD THE ISRAELI DELEGATION, BUT EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT WEIZMAN WILL BE ONE OF THE TEAM MEMBERS. HE WAS PLEASED TO HEAR THE ISRAELI AGREEMENT THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT ONLY PAR-

TICIPATE IN THE SINAI TALKS, BUT BE IN THE CHAIR FOR
THOSE DISCUSSIONS.

-- B. ON DESIGNATING PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES,
SADAT SAID HE HAD NOT RPT NOT THOUGHT ABOUT THIS SINCE
THE CAMP DAVID MEETINGS. HE NEEDED A LITTLE TIME TO
CONSIDER THE MATTER. IT WAS CLEARLY IMPORTANT TO
DESIGNATE "AGREEABLE ELEMENTS" AMONG THE PALESTINIANS

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NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

AND THESE WOULD HAVE TO BE FOUND. (ACTING FONMIN BOUTROS
GHALI TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT SADAT SHOULD BE ABLE TO
DESIGNATE GAZA REPRESENTATIVES, BUT WOULD HAVE A
DIFFICULT TIME DESIGNATING APPROPRIATE WEST BANK RE-
PRESENTATIVES. HE NOTED THAT CONTACTS WITH WEST BANK/
GAZA PALESTINIANS ARE NOT HANDLED BY MFA, BUT BY THE
EGYPTIAN MILITARY AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.)

-- C. ON SINAI OVERFLIGHTS, SADAT NOTED THAT WEIZMAN
HAD RAISED THE SAME SUBJECT WITH HIM AND THAT HE HAD
DECLINED TO REPLY. IN VIEW OF THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST,
SADAT SAID HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO THIS, BUT EMPHASIZED
THAT IT SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE WRITTEN INTO ANY AGREE-
MENT. HE DESCRIBED THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AS A "GREAT
VICTORY" FOR PRESIDENT CARTER AND HIMSELF. IF THE
SINAI AGREEMENT CONTAINS A PROVISION GIVING THE ISRAELIS
THE RIGHT TO OVERFLY SINAI, THIS WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT
PUBLIC REACTION TO THE AGREEMENT. HE WAS NEVERTHELESS
PREPARED TO AGREE TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S REQUEST SO LONG
AS IT IS NOT RPT NOT PUT INTO WRITING. IT SHOULD BE

A "NEIGHBORLY UNDERSTANDING" BETWEEN TWO NEIGHBORING STATES. IF THE ISRAELIS INSIST ON INSCRIBING IT INTO THE AGREEMENT, HE WILL REFUSE IT. AS FOR TACTICAL SECRET

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HANDLING OF THIS MATTER, HE AGREED THAT IT SHOULD BE USED FOR BARGAINING PURPOSES AND THAT A PRICE SHOULD BE EXACTED FOR IT. HE SAID HE WANTED THE PRESIDENT TO GET HIM THE "PRICE" FOR THIS CONCESSION, BUT HE DID NOT RPT NOT SPECIFY WHAT HE HAD IN MIND.

5. FOLLOWING ON THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER, I THEN TOLD HIM OF THE PRELIMINARY WORK THAT HAS BEEN UNDERTAKEN ON THE PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO DELINEATE THE VARIOUS ZONES IN SINAI BASED ON THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND, AS AUTHORIZED BY THE PRESIDENT, WENT THROUGH THE NOTES ON THE PRESIDENT'S CURRENT THINKING ON THESE LINES. SADAT WAS GRATIFIED AT THE PRESIDENT'S INTEREST AND VIEWS AND MADE A NUMBER OF COMMENTS THAT MAY BE OF USE:

-- A. ON THE INTERIM LINE LOCATION, SADAT WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE NORTHERN STARTING POINT AS FAR EAST OF AL ARISH AS POSSIBLE. HE SPOKE OF A STARTING POINT SOME 20 KILOMETERS EAST OF AL ARISH. THIS WOULD BE CLOSE TO, BUT WOULD NOT INCLUDE, YAMIT. THE LATTER WOULD BE IN THE FINAL PHASE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. SADAT AGREED THAT IF THE NORTHERN END IS MOVED EASTWARD, THE ISRAELI SETTLERS SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO STAY UNTIL THE OTHERS HAVE TO LEAVE WHEN THE FINAL PHASE OF IMPLEMENTATION TAKES PLACE.

-- B. ON SHARM EL SHEIKH AND EITAM, SADAT SAID THAT HE DOES NOT RPT NOT WANT UN INSPECTION. AT LEAST THIS SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE WRITTEN INTO THE AGREEMENT. INSTEAD, HE SUGGESTS THAT THE UN MAKE USE OF BOTH OF THESE LOCATIONS AS LOGISTIC HEADQUARTERS. IF IT COULD BE ARRANGED THAT THE UN REQUESTS THE USE OF THESE TWO LOCALES FOR THIS PURPOSE, HE WILL AGREE. SUCH AN SECRET

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ARRANGEMENT WILL IN EFFECT PERMIT THE UN FORCES TO BE PRESENT AND KEEP AN EYE ON THINGS WITHOUT IT BEING A FORMAL INSPECTION. SADAT ALSO NOTED THAT ISRAELI CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT WILL BE USING THESE AIRFIELDS, WHICH SHOULD GIVE THE ISRAELIS THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE FOR THEMSELVES. HE SAID THAT HE HAS NO RPT NO INTENTION

OF UNDERTAKING UNFRIENDLY ACTIVITIES FROM EITHER OF THESE LOCATIONS.

-- C. SADAT HAD NO RPT NO OBJECTION TO UN PATROLS BETWEEN SHARM EL SHEIKH AND BIR TABAR.

-- D. HE WAS AGREEABLE TO AN EQUAL DEMILITARIZED ZONE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BUFFER ZONE INTERIM LINE.

-- E. HE WAS PLEASED THAT THE PRESIDENT AGREES THAT EGYPTIAN CIVIL POLICE SHOULD BE PERMITTED ANYWHERE IN SINAI.

6. SADAT INDICATED THAT IT SHOULD NOT TAKE LONG TO FINALIZE THE SINAI TREATY, ESPECIALLY WITH UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE. HE REITERATED HIS STRONG VIEW THAT PRESIDENT CARTER SHOULD ARRANGE TO BE PRESENT FOR THE SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY. HE, PRESIDENT SADAT AND PRIMIN BEGIN COULD SIGN THE DOCUMENT ON MOUNT SINAI. HIS AIM IS THAT THIS TAKE PLACE ON NOVEMBER 19, THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF HIS TRIP TO JERUSALEM AND HE IS ANXIOUS THAT THE TREATY BE COMPLETED WELL BEFORE THAT TIME.

7. SADAT MADE NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT ON LEBANESE SITUATION. HE SAID THAT HE IS STILL ANALYZING PRESENT SITUATION WITH A VIEW TO CONSIDERING WHAT GOE MAY BE

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NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

ABLE TO DO TO ASSIST IN PROMOTING CONDITIONS FOR THE RETURN OF POLITICAL STABILITY IN THAT COUNTRY. IT WOULD HELP ENORMOUSLY, HE SAID, IF THE SYRIANS WOULD

WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS. SARKIS SHOULD THEN HAVE THE CAPABILITY AND THE BACKING AT HOME TO BEGIN THE HARD TASK OF REASSERTING LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY OVER ALL PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. SO LONG AS THE SYRIAN TROOPS ARE IN LEBANON, EVEN UNDER AN ADF BANNER, SARKIS IS POWERLESS TO ACT AND IS VIEWED BY MANY LEBANESE AS AN AGENT OF SYRIA.

8. OTHER SUBJECTS DISCUSSED WITH SADAT WILL BE REPORTED BY SEPTEL.

9. DEPT MAY WISH PASS THIS MESSAGE TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FOR INFO. EILTS

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